

Greek Universities
Network (GUnet)



Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions

Public Key Infrastructure

Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Certification
Authority (HARICA)

PKI Disclosure Statement (PDS) for the
Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions
Certification Authority

Version 1.7 (Oct 17th, 2022)

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1 Introduction

The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions is supported and operated by the **Greek Universities Network (GUnet)** (<https://www.gunet.gr>), a non-profit civil law company with members all the Universities of Greece, with VAT number **EL099028220**, General Commercial Registry number **160729401000** and Registration of Incorporation number **13392/28-9-2000** lawfully registered in the company's records of the Athens Court of First instance. This GUnet service, hereafter referred to as the Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Certification Authority (HARICA), acts as a Trust Service Provider (TSP) also known as a “Certification Authority”, and as a “Qualified” Trust Service Provider (QTSP). For the rest of this CP/CPS, the terms “TSP” and “QTSP” will be used equally.

HARICA specifically acts as a “Root CA Operator”. The development and initial operation of the service began as part of the Virtual Network Operations Center (VNOC) project, funded by the National Research Network – GRNET (<http://www.grnet.gr>) and continues under the supervision and funding of GUnet. HARICA is operated and managed by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki’s IT Center. Organizations involved in this Public Key Infrastructure unconditionally accept this Certificate Practice Statement / Certificate Policy and co-sign a Memorandum of Understanding.

This document is a PKI Disclosure Statement following the structure of ETSI EN 319 411-1 (Annex A). It is a supplemental instrument of disclosure and notice by HARICA to Subscribers and Relying Parties and does not replace or substitute the latest version of HARICA Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS), published at <https://repo.harica.gr/documents/CPS>.

2 Definitions and acronyms

The Definitions found in the CA/Browser Forum’s Network and Certificate System Security Requirements are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

2.1 Definitions

In this Agreement, the following capitalized terms and expressions shall have the respective meaning ascribed to them below:

Advanced Electronic Seal: An electronic signature that meets the requirements of Article 36 of Regulation (EU) 910/2014.

Advanced Electronic Signature: An electronic signature that meets the requirements of Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 910/2014.

Affiliate: A corporation, partnership, joint venture or other entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with another entity, or an agency, department, or any entity operating under the direct control of a Government Entity.

Applicant: The natural person or Legal Entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate issues, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber. For Certificates issued to devices, the Applicant is the entity that controls or operates

the device named in the Certificate, even if the device is sending the actual certificate request.

Applicant Representative: A natural person acting on behalf of the Applicant, in a legally binding manner, who is employed either by the Applicant or an agent duly authorized to represent the Applicant:

- (i) who signs and submits, or approves a certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or
- (ii) who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or
- (iii) who acknowledges and agrees to the Certificate Terms of Use contained in this Agreement on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of HARICA.

Application Software Supplier: A supplier of Internet browser software or other relying-party application software that displays or uses Certificates and incorporates HARICA Root Certificates.

CA Certificate: A Certificate in which the basic constraints field has the CA attribute set to TRUE.

Certificate: An electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key and an identity.

Certificate Data: The Certificate requests and data related thereto (whether obtained from the Applicant or otherwise) in HARICA's possession or control or to which HARICA has access.

Certificate for Electronic Signature: An electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key and an identity.

Certificate Policy: A set of rules that indicates the applicability of a named Certificate to a particular community and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.

Certificate Revocation List: A regularly updated time-stamped list of revoked Certificates that is created and digitally signed by the CA that issued the Certificates.

Certification Authority: An organization that is responsible for the creation, issuance, revocation, and management of Certificates.

Certification Practice Statement: One of several documents forming the governance framework in which Certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.

Certificate Systems: The system used by a HARICA or Delegated Third Party in providing identity verification, registration and enrollment, certificate approval, issuance, validity status, support, and other PKI-related services.

Code Signing Certificate: A digital certificate that contains a code Signing EKU and is trusted in an Application Software Provider's root store to sign software objects

Coordinated Universal Time (UTC): The time scale based on the second as defined in Recommendation ITU-R TF.460-6.

Delegated Third Party: A natural person or Legal Entity that is not the CA but is authorized by HARICA to assist in the Certificate Management Process by performing or fulfilling one or more of the CA requirements found herein.

Domain Contact: The Domain Name Registrant, technical contact, or administrative contact (or the equivalent under a ccTLD) as listed in the WHOIS record of the Base Domain Name or in a DNS SOA record, or as obtained through direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar.

Domain Name: The label assigned to a node in the Domain Name System.

Domain Namespace: The set of all possible Domain Names that are subordinate to a single node in the Domain Name System.

Fully-Qualified Domain Name: A Domain Name that includes the labels of all superior nodes in the Internet Domain Name System.

Government Entity: A government-operated legal entity, agency, department, ministry, branch, or similar element of the government of a country, or political subdivision within such country (such as a state, province, city, county, etc.).

Key Compromise: A Private Key is considered to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, an unauthorized person has had access to it, or there exists a practical technique by which an unauthorized person may discover its value.

Legal Entity: An [association](#), [corporation](#), [partnership](#), [proprietorship](#), [trust](#), government entity or other entity with [legal standing, as the subject of rights and obligations](#) in a country's legal system.

OCSP Responder: An online server operated under the authority of the CA and connected to its Repository for processing Certificate status requests and providing Online Certificate Status Protocol responses. See also, Online Certificate Status Protocol.

Online Certificate Status Protocol: An online Certificate-checking protocol that enables relying-party application software to determine the status of an identified Certificate. See also OCSP Responder.

Private Key: The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create Digital Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.

Public Key: The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify Digital Signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.

Public Key Infrastructure: A set of hardware, software, people, procedures, rules, policies, and obligations used to facilitate the trustworthy creation, issuance, management, and use of Certificates and keys based on Public Key Cryptography.

Publicly-Trusted Certificate: A Certificate that is trusted by virtue of the fact that its corresponding Root Certificate is distributed as a trust anchor in widely-available application software.

Qualified Auditor: A natural person or Legal Entity that meets the requirements of CP/CPS section 8.2 (Auditor Qualifications).

Qualified Certificate for electronic seal: A Certificate for Qualified Electronic Seal that is issued by a qualified trust service provider and meets the requirements of Annex III of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014

Qualified Certificate for electronic signature: A Certificate for Qualified Electronic Signatures that is issued by a qualified trust service provider and meets the requirements of Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014

Qualified Electronic Seal: An Advanced Electronic Seal that is created by a Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device, and which is based on a Qualified Certificate for Electronic Seal, as specified in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.

Qualified Electronic Signature: An Advanced Electronic Signature that is created by a Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device, and which is based on a Qualified Certificate for electronic signatures, as specified in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.

Qualified Electronic Signature/Seal Creation Device: Also known as QSCD. An electronic signature creation device that meets the requirements of Annex II of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.

Qualified Electronic Time-stamp: An electronic Time-stamp that meets the requirements of Article 42 of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.

Registration Authority (RA): Any Entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of Certificates, but is not a CA, and hence does not sign or issue Certificates. An RA may assist in the certificate application process or revocation process or both. When "RA" is used as an adjective to describe a role or function, it does not necessarily imply a separate body, but can be part of the CA.

Relying Party: Any natural person or Legal Entity that relies on a Valid Certificate. An Application Software Supplier is not considered a Relying Party when software distributed by such Supplier merely displays information relating to a Certificate.

Repository: An online database containing publicly-disclosed PKI governance documents (such as Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements) and Certificate status information, either in the form of a CRL or an OCSP response.

Root CA Operator: The top-level Certification Authority (i.e. an organization) whose CA Certificate (or associated Public Key) is distributed by Application Software Suppliers as a trust anchor.

Root CA Certificate: A CA Certificate in which the Public Key has been digitally signed by its corresponding Private Key.

Subject: The natural person, device, system, unit, or Legal Entity identified in a Certificate as the Subject. The Subject is either the Subscriber or a device under the control and operation of the Subscriber.

Subscriber: A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

Subscriber Agreement: This agreement between HARICA and the Applicant/Subscriber that specifies the rights and responsibilities of the parties.

Suspect Code: Code that contains malicious functionality or serious vulnerabilities, including spyware, malware and other code that installs without the user's consent and/or resists its own removal, and code that can be exploited in ways not intended by its designers to compromise the trustworthiness of the platforms on which it executes.

Terms of Use: The provisions contained in this Agreement regarding the safekeeping and acceptable uses of a Certificate issued in accordance with the CP/CPS when the Applicant/Subscriber is an Affiliate of HARICA or IS HARICA.

Time-Stamp: Data in electronic form which binds other electronic data to a particular time establishing evidence that these data existed at that time.

Time-Stamp Token (TST): A data object that binds a representation of a datum to a particular time with a digital signature, thus establishing evidence.

Time-Stamping Authority (TSA): The TSP providing time-stamping services using one or more time-stamping units.

Time-Stamping Unit (TSU): A set of hardware and software which is managed as a unit and has a single time-stamp signing key active at a time.

TSA Disclosure statement: A set of statements about the policies and practices of a TSA that particularly require emphasis or disclosure to subscribers and relying parties, for example to meet regulatory requirements.

Validity Period: The period of time measured from the date when the Certificate is issued until the Expiry Date.

2.2 Acronyms

Short Term	Explained Term
CA	Certification Authority
CAA	Certification Authority Authorization
ccTLD	Country Code Top-Level Domain
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
CT	Certificate Transparency
DN	Distinguished Name
DVCP	Domain Validation Certificates Policy
EKU	Extended Key Usage
EVCP	Extended Validation Certificates Policy
FIPS	United States Federal Information Processing Standards
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
QSCD	Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device
QTSP	Qualified Trust Service Provider
HSM	Hardware Security Module
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IANA	Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
ITU-T	ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
OCSP	On-line Certificate Status Protocol
OID	International Standards Organization's Object Identifier
OVCP	Organizational Validation Certificates Policy
PIN	Personal identification number
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standard
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX	IETF Working Group on PKI
PMC	Policy Management Committee
RA	Registration Authority
SHA	Secure Hashing Algorithm
SSCD	Secure Signature Creation Device
S/MIME	Secure multipurpose Internet mail extensions
SSL	Secure Socket Layer
subCA	Subordinate Certification Authority
TLD	Top Level Domain
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TSA	Time-Stamping Authority
TST	Time-Stamp Token
TSU	Time-Stamping Unit
TSP	Trust Service Provider
URL	Uniform Resource Locator

UTC	Coordinated Universal Time
X.509	ITU-T standard for Certificates and authentication framework

3 TSP contact information

3.1 Policy Making Organization

HARICA CP/CPS and all subscriber/third-party agreements, security policy documents and procedural documents, are administered by HARICA Policy Management Committee (PMC), appointed by the GUnet governing board.

ca-admin at harica.gr

Greek Universities Network GUnet
National and Kapodestrian University of Athens. – Network Operations Center
University Campus 157 84
Tel: +30-210 7275611
Fax: +30-210 7275601

3.2 Contact Information for support and revocation requests **support at harica.gr**

Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Certification Authority
Greek Universities Network GUnet
National and Kapodestrian University of Athens. – Network Operations Center
University Campus 157 84
Tel: +30-2310 999000
Fax: +30-2310 999100

Contact HARICA for Certificate Problem Reports by sending an e-mail to “**cert-problem-report at harica.gr**”.

HARICA also maintains a continuous 24x7 ability to respond internally to a high-priority Certificate Problem Report to the e-mail address “**high-priority-cert-problem-report at harica.gr**”, and where appropriate, forward such a complaint to competent public authorities, and/or revoke a Certificate that is the subject of such a complaint. Also see sections 4.9.3.2 and 4.9.3.3 of the HARICA CP/CPS.

4 Certificate types, validation procedures and usage

HARICA issues various types of certificates. All Certificates have a Subject field that contain information for the Subject. This information is validated by HARICA following procedures described in section 3.2 of the HARICA CP/CPS.

4.1 Certificate types and validation procedures

Subject information is composed according to the certificate type. The Subscriber’s name is called a Distinguished Name (DN).

DN Attribute	Interpretation
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CN or common name (OID: 2.5.4.3)	If present, for SSL/TLS certificates, this field SHALL contain an FQDN or an IP Address that is one of the values contained in the Certificate's subjectAltName extension. For Client, S/MIME or Code Signing certificates, this field SHALL contain a representation of the Subject's name. For non-TLS Certificates, this field is used for user-friendly representation of the Subject's name to represent itself. This name does not need to be exact match of the fully registered organization name or the person's formal given name and surname.
G or givenName (OID: 2.5.4.42)	Subject's formal given name
SN or surname (OID: 2.5.4.4)	Subject's formal surname
E or emailAddress	Subject's email address
streetAddress (OID: 2.5.4.9)	The physical address of the Subject
postalCode (OID: 2.5.4.17)	The postal code for the physical address
L or Locality (OID: 2.5.4.7)	Postal address City
ST for State or Province Name (OID: 2.5.4.8)	Postal address State or Province
C or Country (OID: 2.5.4.6)	Subject's Country
O or Organization (OID: 2.5.4.10)	Subject's full registered Organization Name. For QEVCP-w, QEVCP-w-psd2 and EV Certificates , the interpretation of this attribute is explained in section 9.2.1 of the EV Guidelines.
OU or Organizational Unit	Subject Organizational Unit or sub-unit, or special attribute of the signatory depending on the intended use or attributes of the certificate.
serialNumber (OID: 2.5.4.5)	A unique identifier to disambiguate the Subject Name within the context of an Issuing CA. For QEVCP-w, QEVCP-w-psd2 and EV Certificates , the interpretation of this attribute is explained in section 9.2.6 of the EV Guidelines
OrganizationIdentifier (OID: 2.5.4.97)	A unique identifier for the Organization
businessCategory (OID: 2.5.4.15)	For QEVCP-w, QEVCP-w-psd2 and EV Certificates only . This field SHALL contain one of the following strings: "Private Organization", "Government Entity", "Business Entity", or "Non-Commercial Entity" depending upon whether the Subject qualifies under the

	terms of section 8.5.2, 8.5.3, 8.5.4 or 8.5.5 of the EV Guidelines, respectively.
jurisdictionCountryName (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3) jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2) jurisdictionLocalityName (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.1)	For QEVCP-w, QEVCP-w-psd2 and EV Certificates only. These fields SHALL NOT contain information that is not relevant to the level of the Incorporating Agency or Registration Agency. The interpretation of this attribute is explained in section 9.2.5 of the EV Guidelines

The subject field identifies the entity associated with the Public Key stored in the subject Public Key field. It contains the following:

- Email (E) (Not applicable for SSL/TLS certificates): The e-mail address of the subject as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.3.
- commonName (OID: 2.5.4.3) (Optional for SSL certificates, Required for Code Signing and Client Certificates): This is the Subject's Common Name.
 If present for SSL/TLS certificates, this field SHALL contain exactly one entry that is one of the values contained in the Certificate's subjectAltName extension. The value of the field SHALL be encoded as follows:
 - If the value is an IPv4 address, then the value SHALL be encoded as an IPv4Address as specified in RFC 3986, section 3.2.2.
 - If the value is an IPv6 address, then the value SHALL be encoded in the text representation specified in RFC 5952, section 4.
 - If the value is a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or Wildcard Domain Name, then the value SHALL be encoded as a character-for-character copy of the dNSName entry value from the subjectAltName extension. Specifically, all Domain Labels of the Fully-Qualified Domain Name or FQDN portion of the Wildcard Domain Name must be encoded as LDH Labels, and P-Labels SHALL NOT be converted to their Unicode representation.

For Client, S/MIME or Code Signing certificates, this field SHALL contain a representation of the Subject's name as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1. Common names that also belong to the DNS namespace are forbidden for non-SSL certificates.

- givenName (OID: 2.5.4.42) and surname (OID: 2.5.4.4): Per QCP-n and QCP-n-qscd, contain a representation of the Subject's given name and surname as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1. Further specifications from ETSI EN 319 412-2 apply.
- streetAddress (OID: 2.5.4.9): The physical address of the Subject as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1.
- postalCode (OID: 2.5.4.17): The postal code for the physical address of the Subject as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1.
- organizationalUnitName (OID: 2.5.4.11) (Optional): Subject Organizational Unit or sub-unit, or special attribute of the signatory depending on the intended use or attributes of the certificate. HARICA prevents an OU attribute from including a name, DBA, tradename, trademark, address, location, or other text that refers to a specific natural person or Legal Entity unless HARICA has verified this information in accordance with CP/CPS section 3.2 and the Certificate also contains

subject:organizationName, subject:givenName, subject:surname, subject:localityName, and subject:countryName attributes, also verified in accordance with CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1. This field SHALL NOT be present in SSL/TLS Certificates.

- organizationName (OID: 2.5.4.10): This field SHALL contain either the Subject's name as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1 or DBA as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.2. HARICA may include information in this field that differs slightly from the verified name, such as common variations or abbreviations, provided that HARICA documents the difference and any abbreviations used are locally accepted abbreviations; e.g., if the official record shows "Company Name Incorporated", HARICA MAY use "Company Name Inc." or "Company Name". For TLS OV/EV Certificates, this field is required and it is optional for TLS IV Certificates if the Natural Person's subject information is included in the givenName and surname fields, and the information is verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.3. For EV Certificates, this attribute must be verified according to section 9.2.1 of the EV Guidelines.
- localityName (OID: 2.5.4.7) (Optional): The city, village or local territory where the subject entity is located, as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1. For TLS OV/EV Certificates it is required if stateOrProvinceName is missing, otherwise it is optional.
- stateOrProvinceName (OID: 2.5.4.8) (Optional): The state, prefecture or wider geographical division where the subject entity is located, as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1. For TLS OV/EV Certificates it is required if localityName is missing, otherwise it is optional.
- countryName (OID: 2.5.4.6): Subject Country as verified under CP/CPS section 3.2.2.3
- Subject Public Key Information: Contains the Public Key and identifies the algorithm with which the Key is used and its size. Code Signing certificates SHALL chain up to a 4096-bit RSA or ECC equivalent (P384) CA.
- serialNumber (OID: 2.5.4.5) (Required for EV, QEVCP-w) (Optional for LCP, NCP, NCP+, QCP-n, QCP-n-qscd, QNCP-w):
 - Per EV and QEVCP-w it contains the Registration Number of the Legal Entity of the Subject.
 - For Private Organizations, this field SHALL contain the Registration (or similar) Number assigned to the Subject by the Incorporating or Registration Agency in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration, as appropriate. If the Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration does not provide a Registration Number, then the date of Incorporation or Registration SHALL be entered into this field in any one of the common date formats.
 - For Government Entities that do not have a Registration Number or readily verifiable date of creation, HARICA SHALL enter the value "Government Entity".
 - For Business Entities, the Registration Number that was received by the Business Entity upon government registration SHALL be entered in this field. For those Business Entities that register with an Incorporating Agency or Registration Agency in a jurisdiction that does not issue numbers pursuant to government registration, the

date of the registration SHALL be entered into this field in any one of the common date formats.

- Per QCP-n and QCP-n-qscd, contains a unique identifier to disambiguate the Subject Name within the context of an Issuing CA per ETSI EN 319 412-2. Depending on the Person's decision, one of the following identifiers may be used:
 - Social Security Number with the following semantics: "PNOGR-12345678". In this example, GR is the Subject's Country.
 - Personal Identification Card with the following semantics: "IDCGR-AK1234567". In this example, GR is the Subject's Country.
 - Tax Identification Number with the following semantics: "TINEL-123456789".
 - Passport Number with the following semantics: "PASGR-1231232". In this example, GR is the Subject's Country.
 - A Unique 10-digit Identifier assigned by HARICA
- businessCategory (OID: 2.5.4.15): For EV Certificates, this attribute must contain one of the following strings: "Private Organization", "Government Entity", "Business Entity", or "Non-Commercial Entity" depending upon whether the Subject qualifies under the terms of section 8.5.2, 8.5.3, 8.5.4 or 8.5.5 of the EV Guidelines, respectively.
- *jurisdictionCountryName* (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3),
jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2),
jurisdictionLocalityName (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.1): For EV Certificates, this is the Subject Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration Field according to section 9.2.5 of the EV Guidelines.
- OrganizationIdentifier (OID: 2.5.4.97): Per QCP-l, QCP-l-qscd, QNCP-w-OV contains a unique identifier for the Organization per ETSI EN 319 412-3. Depending on the Legal Entity's decision, one of the following identifiers must be used:
 - Legal Entity's Identification Number from a national trade register with the following semantics: "NTRGR-123456789". In this example, GR is the Subject's Country.
 - Legal Entity's Tax Identification Number with the following semantics: "VATEL-123456789".
 - Legal Entity's Legal Entity Identifier with the following semantics: "LEIXG-123456789" validated as specified in CP/CPS section 3.2.2.1.1.

For PSD2 Certificates, the semantics shall follow clause 5.1.4 of ETSI TS 119 412-1 which uses the scheme "PSD" for identification based on national authorization number of a payment service provider under Payments Services Directive (EU) 2015/2366. This shall use the extended structure as defined in ETSI TS 119 495, clause 5.2.1.

- With the exception of EV Certificates, other subjectDN attributes MAY be present within the subject field. If present, other attributes SHALL contain information that has been verified by HARICA.

4.1.1 SSL/TLS Certificate

By issuing an SSL/TLS Certificate, HARICA represents that it followed the procedures set forth in its CP/CPS to verify that, as of the Certificate's issuance date, all Subject Information was accurate. HARICA shall not include a Domain Name or IP Address in a Subject attribute except as specified in CP/CPS section 3.2.2.4 or section 3.2.2.5. Subject attributes for SSL/TLS Certificates MUST NOT contain only metadata such as '.', '-', and ' ' (i.e. space) characters, and/or any other indication that the value is absent, incomplete, or not applicable.

4.1.2 Client/Code Signing Certificate

By issuing a Client/Code Signing Certificate, HARICA represents that it followed the procedures set forth in its CP/CPS to verify that, as of the Certificate's issuance date, all Subject Information was accurate. HARICA shall not include a commonName, emailAddress in a Subject attribute except as specified in CP/CPS section 3.2.3. Because Subject name attributes for individuals (e.g. givenName (2.5.4.42) and surname (2.5.4.4) are not broadly supported by application software, HARICA may use the subject:organizationName field to convey a natural person Subject's name or DBA.

Subscribers are bound to provide complete, accurate and truthful information (e.g., application name, information URL, application description, etc.) in the signed code. Subscribers are also committed to not deliberately sign Suspect Code and acknowledge that such an action will allow HARICA to automatically revoke the signing Certificate.

4.1.3 Certificate for electronic signatures

By issuing a Certificate for Advanced electronic signatures under the QCP-n policy or a Certificate for Qualified electronic signatures under the QCP-n-qscd policy, HARICA shall include at least the "commonName", "Country", "givenName" and "surname" attributes in the SubjectDN field. If these attributes are not sufficient to ensure Subject name uniqueness within the context of the Issuing CA, then the serialNumber shall be present.

4.1.4 Certificate for electronic seals

By issuing a Certificate for Advanced electronic seals under the QCP-l policy or a Certificate for Qualified electronic seals under the QCP-l-qscd policy, HARICA shall include at least the "commonName", "Country", "organizationName" and "OrganizationIdentifier" attributes in the SubjectDN field.

4.1.5 Time-Stamp Tokens

HARICA also issues Time-Stamp Tokens and Qualified Time-Stamp Tokens. Qualified Time-stamp Tokens comply with Regulation (EU) 910/2014 (eIDAS). Both types of Time-Stamp Tokens provide proof that a datum existed before a point in time.

4.2 Certificate Usage

4.2.1 Appropriate certificate uses

HARICA Certificates can be used for authentication, encryption, access control and digital signing, in all network services and applications in which the required level of security is equal or lower than that of the certificate issuance process.

Typical applications in which digital certificates issued by HARICA can be used, are the following (the list is not restrictive):

a) Signing of an “electronic document” by a natural person or legal entity using a digital certificate and the relevant private key, preferably with the use of a “Secure Signature Creation Device” SSCD or a “Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Device” QSCD (e.g. smart card or e-token), so that at least the following characteristics are ensured:

- 1) the authenticity of origin,
- 2) the integrity of the signed document i.e. that its content has not been modified since the time of its’ signature and
- 3) the binding of the signatory to the content of document and the non-repudiation of signature.

b) Signing of email messages, as a proof of authenticity of the sender’s email address and for all the attributes described in (a). Moreover, they can be used for secure proof of receipt of messages (non-repudiation of receipt).

c) Persistent proof of identity (Strong Authentication) of a user or a device throughout communication with other entities, guaranteeing high-level security characteristics, stronger than the ones provided by password-based access control methods.

d) “Encryption of documents and messages” with the use of the recipient’s publicly available certificate, ensuring that only she/he, the holder of corresponding private key, can decipher and read the document or the message.

e) Certification of other Trust Service Providers or other additional services of certification, e.g. time-stamping, digital notarization and long-term secure preservation of data.

f) In the implementation of secure network protocols, such as SSL/TLS, IPSec etc.

Only Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Devices shall be used for the creation of Key Pairs associated with Certificates for Qualified Electronic Signatures/Seals.

HARICA also operates as a Qualified Time-Stamping Authority providing Qualified and non-Qualified Time-Stamp Tokens. If a TSU issues time-stamps that are claimed to be qualified electronic time-stamps as per Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, this TSU shall not issue non-qualified electronic time-stamps.

4.2.2 Forbidden certificate use

Certificates cannot be used for services or systems that, in the case of disruption or failure, lead to considerable tangible or intangible damage or danger of life or any other uses that are not included in the first paragraph of CP/CPS section 1.4.1.

TLS Server Certificates shall not be used for man-in-the-middle (MITM) or traffic management of domain names or IPs that the certificate holder does not legitimately own or control. Such certificate usage is explicitly prohibited.

5 Reliance limits

HARICA has no reliance limits other than the ones described in the appropriate and forbidden certificate use stated in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of the CP/CPS.

The retention period for archived logs is documented in CP/CPS section 5.5.2.

For the Time-Stamp Tokens, HARICA conforms with requirements set in ETSI EN 319 421 and includes an “accuracy” field with a minimum accuracy of one (1) second to a UTC source. If it is detected that the time that would be indicated in a time-stamp drifts or jumps out of synchronization with UTC, the Time-Stamping Unit shall stop time-stamp issuance.

6 Obligations of Subscribers

Each Subscriber represents and warrants the following:

- ✓ has read, accepts and shall comply with HARICA’s Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement. Subscriber is obliged to use the certificates solely for the purposes described in the CP/CPS Section 1.4.1 and the applicable law. HARICA Certificates cannot be used for services or systems that, in the case of disruption or failure, lead to considerable tangible or intangible damage or danger of life.
- ✓ the Subscriber’s request for certificate and issuance of the certificate itself is clear from any third-party intellectual property or proprietary rights, does not contain data which in any way interferes with or infringes upon the rights of any third party in any jurisdiction with respect to patents, trademarks, service marks, trade names, company names, "doing business as" (DBA) names and other trade rights, and does not present the data for any unlawful purpose whatsoever. Data covered by this representation and warranty includes but is not limited to any domain name, domain name space, Distinguished Name (DN), or Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), and/or any trade name or DBA name, contained in any part of the certificate request.
- ✓ shall create a key pair (private and public) using a reliable and secure system and shall take all necessary precautions to protect their private key from accidental destruction, loss or theft.
- ✓ After receiving the Certificate, the Subscriber shall review and verify that the information contained in the Certificate is accurate.
- ✓ shall promptly request certificate revocation when it is not used anymore, when the data contained has changed or when it is suspected that the private key has been compromised or lost. Failure to request revocation of the Certificate, the Subscriber acknowledges and accepts that has no claim for liability, in case of mis-use of the private key or the Certificate, when it should have been revoked.
- ✓ For TLS Certificates, when the Subscriber requests revocation, the most appropriate revocation reason should be selected, as described in the CP/CPS section 4.9.1.1.
- ✓ **Accuracy of Information:** An obligation and warranty to always provide accurate and complete information to HARICA, both in the certificate request and as otherwise requested by HARICA in connection with the issuance of the Certificate(s) to be supplied by HARICA.
- ✓ **Termination of Use of Certificate:** An obligation and warranty to promptly cease all use of the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key included in the Certificate upon revocation of that Certificate for reasons of Key Compromise.
- ✓ **Responsiveness:** An obligation to respond to HARICA’s instructions concerning Key Compromise or Certificate misuse within a specified time period.
- ✓ **Acknowledgment and Acceptance:** An acknowledgment and acceptance that HARICA is entitled to revoke the certificate immediately if the Subscriber were to violate the Terms of Use of this Agreement or if HARICA discovers that the Certificate is being used to enable criminal activities such as phishing attacks, fraud, or the distribution of malware.

In the case of HARICA TSA Subscribers:

- ✓ must verify that the requested TST has been signed by a TSU private key that corresponds to a valid HARICA TSU Certificate and check for possible revocations.

In the case of HARICA Code Signing Subscribers, in addition to the above obligations and warranties:

- ✓ **Protection of Private Key:** Where the key is available outside a Signing Service, to maintain sole control of, keep confidential, and properly protect, at all times in accordance with CP/CPS section 6.2.7.4, the Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key to be included in the requested Certificate(s) (and any associated activation data or device, e.g. password or token). HARICA SHALL provide the Subscriber with documentation on how to protect a Private Key. HARICA MAY provide this documentation as a white paper or as part of this Subscriber Agreement. The Subscriber SHALL represent that it will generate and operate any device storing private keys in a secure manner, as described in a document of code signing best practices, which HARICA SHALL provide to the Subscriber during the ordering process. HARICA SHALL obligate the Subscriber to use passwords that are randomly generated with at least 16 characters containing uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols to transport private keys.
- ✓ **Private Key Reuse:** To not apply for a Code Signing Certificate if the Public Key in the Certificate is or will be used with a non-Code Signing Certificate.
- ✓ **Use:** To use the Certificate and associated Private Key only for authorized and legal purposes, including not using the Certificate to sign Suspect Code and to use the Certificate and Private Key solely in compliance with all applicable laws and solely in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

Depending on the type of Certificate issued and the corresponding certificate hierarchy, Subscribers and HARICA must comply with the **certificate revocation and suspension requirements** described in section 4.9 of the CP/CPS.

7 Certificate status checking obligations of Relying Parties and other obligations

The entities that trust the provided certification services or otherwise called the Relying Parties can be any entity, which uses in any way the certification tokens (digital certificates, digital signatures, time stamps etc.) and relies on the information that they contain.

In particular, entities that trust the Certification Services are the natural persons or legal entities who, after being informed and having agreed with the terms and conditions concerning the use of the certificates as described in the HARICA CP/CPS, and after having checked and verified the validity of a certificate that has been issued by HARICA, they decide whether they can rely on the content of this certificate in order to proceed to specific actions or justified belief.

In order to verify the validity of the signature created by a Certificate, Relying Parties must check that:

- ✓ The certificate was within its validity period.

- √ The certificate is correctly chained to a HARICA Subordinate CA Certificate that chains to one of HARICA's publicly trusted Root CA Certificates.
- √ The certificate was not revoked for any reason when the signing operation occurred.
- √ Subject identification matches the details that the signer presents.
- √ The usage of the certificate matches the intended usage it was issued for, by HARICA.
- √ The terms and conditions as described in the HARICA CP/CPS are fulfilled.

The following Representations and Warranties apply to Relying Parties

- ✓ HARICA Certificates cannot be used for services or systems that, in the case of disruption or failure, lead to considerable tangible or intangible damage or danger of life.
- ✓ Entities that trust the issued certificates are obligated to read and accept this Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement and to use the certificates only in ways that conform to this CP/CPS and the current legislation.
- ✓ Entities that trust the certificates must check the validity of the digital certificate signature and trust the parent Certification Authorities. Finally, they should periodically check the validity of the certificate against the relevant Certificate Revocation List or use the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service for possible revocations.
- ✓ Entities that trust the certificates must check the Extended Key Usage X.509 Extension in the End-Entity Certificate and Issuing CA Certificate for the appropriate use of the certificates.
- ✓ Collect enough information to determine the extent to which they can rely on a digital certificate
- ✓ Bear full and sole responsibility for any decision to rely on a digital certificate
- ✓ Bear the full consequences, including legal liability, for any failure to observe their obligations and responsibilities as detailed in this CP/CPS.
- ✓ Entities that trust the Time-Stamps must verify that the TST has been signed by a TSU private key that corresponds to a valid HARICA TSU Certificate and check for possible revocations and that the private key used to sign the time-stamp has not been compromised until the time of the verification. If this verification occurs after the expiration date of the TSU Certificates, the provisions of Annex D of ETSI EN 319 421 provide guidance.
- ✓ Entities that trust the Time-Stamps must consider any limitations of the usage of the time-stamp indicated by the time-stamp policy and consider any other precautions prescribed in agreements or elsewhere.
- ✓ Entities that trust the Time-Stamps as "Qualified", must use the designated EU "Trusted List" to establish whether the time-stamp unit and the timestamp are qualified. If the public key of the TSU is listed in the Trusted List and the service it represents is a qualified time-stamping service, then the time-stamps issued by this TSU can be considered as qualified.

8 Limited warranty and disclaimer/Limitation of liability

This clause applies to liability under contract (including under any indemnity or breach of warranty), in tort (including negligence), under statute or otherwise for non –

compliant usage of the certificate(s) the associated private keys, the revocation status information or any other hardware or software provided, and any consequential, incidental, special, or exemplary damages arising out of or related to HARICA's CP/CPS, including but not limited to, loss of data, loss of business and loss of profit. Except as set out in the next paragraph, and to the extent permitted by applicable law, HARICA cannot and shall not be held liable for any problems or damages that may arise from its services in case of wrongful, negligent or improper use of the issued certificates. HARICA does not undertake any financial, civil or other responsibilities for such cases. Using HARICA and its certification services requires that users unconditionally accept the terms and services and that HARICA is not liable and does not undertake any financial, civil or other responsibilities, except for cases where there is evidence of fraudulent intent or serious negligence by HARICA or its operators. HARICA shall not be liable to the Subscriber for any loss suffered by the Subscriber due to use of a Certificate outside the normal and intended use. Subscribers are obliged to request Certificate revocation for reasons stated in the CP/CPS section 9.6.3. Failure to request revocation of the Certificate, voids any liability claims if the private key or the Certificate is mis-used, when it should have been revoked with actions originating from the Subscriber.

If HARICA deviates significantly from the provisions set forth in the CP/CPS when issuing "**Certificates for Qualified electronic signatures**", "**Certificates for Qualified electronic seals**", "**Qualified Certificates for web site authentication**", "**Extended Validation Certificates for SSL or Code Signing**", certain liability provisions apply:

- HARICA is only liable for the correct verification of the application and the resultant contents of the Certificate (except for the "OU" field as stated in the CP/CPS section 9.6.2).
- HARICA shall not be liable if the Applicant/Subscriber supplied false or tampered validation evidence and information from this evidence was included in the Certificate. In this case, the Subscriber is liable for damage which HARICA and/or GUnet may suffer due to incorrect data being included in the Certificate or if the Subscriber uses such a Certificate in an incorrect way.

Except for the previous cases, HARICA's liability under the CP/CPS sustained by Subscribers or Relying Parties is limited to a maximum of **2.000€ per Certificate for Qualified Signatures/Seals, Qualified Certificates for website authentication, Extended Validation Certificates for SSL and Extended Validation Certificates for Code Signing** and a total maximum of claims of **1.000.000€**, regardless of the nature of the liability and the type, amount or extent of any damages suffered. The Liability limitations provided in this paragraph shall be the same irrespective to the number of Certificates, transactions, or claims related to such Certificate. The limitations on Liability provided herein shall apply to the maximum extent allowed under the applicable Law of the applicable jurisdiction. This is covered via a Professional Liability/Errors and Omissions insurance, with policy limits of five million Euros (5.000.000€) in coverage, including coverage for (i) claims for damages arising out of an act, error, or omission, unintentional breach of contract, or neglect in issuing or maintaining Certificates for Qualified Signatures/Seals, Qualified Certificates for web site authentication, Extended Validation Certificates for SSL and Extended Validation Certificates for Code Signing, and (ii) claims for damages arising

out of infringement of the proprietary rights of any third party (excluding copyright, and trademark infringement), and invasion of privacy and advertising injury.

8.1 Indemnification

The Subscriber shall indemnify HARICA and its affiliates and their respective directors, officers, employees and agents (each an “Indemnified Person”) against all liabilities, losses, expenses or costs (collectively “Losses”) that, directly or indirectly are based on Subscriber’s breach of this Agreement, any information, misrepresentation or breach of warranty or covenant provided by the Subscriber or Subscriber’s or its customers’ interference or infringement upon the rights of any third party and shall be responsible for defending all actions against an Indemnified Person.

The indemnification obligations of the Subscriber are not HARICA’s sole remedy for Subscriber’s breach and are in addition to any other remedies HARICA may have against the Subscriber under this Agreement. The Subscriber’s indemnification obligations survive the termination of this Agreement.

9 Applicable agreements, CPS, CP

See the HARICA CP/CPS at <https://repo.harica.gr/documents/CPS>

10 Privacy Policy

10.1 Information treated as private

Registration Authorities undergo personal information processing during the identification and validation procedure of the Applicant which is treated as private. Personal information is not disclosed unless it is required by law or included in the certificate public information (for example the *subject* field of the certificate) with Applicant’s consent. If the Applicant agrees to include personal information related to personal identification described in CP/CPS section 7.1.4.7 (Social Security Number, Personal Identification, Tax Identification, Passport Number) in the Subscriber Certificate, then this information is not considered private.

10.2 Information not deemed private

Information included in the issued digital certificates is not considered private. If the Applicant, during the Certificate request process, requested personal information to be embedded in the issued Certificate, the Subscriber consents to HARICA’s disclosure of this information publicly by embedding the information in the issued Certificate. Subscriber Certificates are publicly disclosed at HARICA’s Repository, which implements restrictions to protect against enumeration attacks.

10.3 Responsibility to protect private information

HARICA has implemented a Data Protection Policy and issued its Data Privacy Statement, available at <https://repo.harica.gr/documents/Data-Privacy-Statement-EN.pdf> in compliance with applicable laws relating to data protection and any equivalent legislation and EU Regulations.

All private and personal information handled and processed by HARICA, is in accordance to the Greek legislation concerning personal data protection. There are

specific technical and organizational measures in place to prevent unauthorized and unlawful processing or accidental loss of private and personal information.

10.4 Notice and consent to use private information

Unless otherwise stated in HARICA's CP/CPS, the applicable Data Privacy Statement (available at <https://repo.harica.gr/documents/Data-Privacy-Statement-EN.pdf>) or by agreement, all private and personal information handled and processed by HARICA are not used without prior notice or consent, where applicable of the party to whom it concerns, in accordance with applicable data protection laws and any equivalent legislation and EU Regulations.

10.5 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

All non-classified information stored at the Certification and Registration Authorities is available to the law enforcement authorities, after their official written request.

Classified and personal information can be disclosed to the judicial authority if a properly constituted and enforceable instrument is issued, such an official court order, judgment or administrative action or demand, in accordance with general principles of law and applicable legislation.

The process is carried out through the Policy Management Committee of HARICA (see section 1.5 of the CP/CPS). Private keys used to sign and issue digital certificates are never disclosed to any third-parties, unless HARICA is obliged to such disclosure under applicable and enforceable law.

10.6 Other information disclosure circumstances

All non-classified and non-private information stored at the Certification and Registration Authorities is available for entity queries, upon request for reasons of legitimate interest.

All information stored at the CA and RA is available to its rightful owner (e.g. individual who applied for a certificate), upon rightful owner's request.

This clause is subject to applicable data protection laws and EU Regulations.

10.6.1 Publicity

By accepting the Terms, Subscriber grants HARICA the right to use Subscriber's brand name and/or logo, to identify as a customer on HARICA's website or other marketing or advertising materials without any previous notice.

Subscribers may opt out by informing HARICA at support@harica.gr, within the first 30 days of their subscription.

11 Refund policy

Not defined

12 Applicable law, complaints and dispute resolution

This PKI Disclosure Statement and the Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement of HARICA Public Key Infrastructure shall be interpreted, construed and enforced in all respects in accordance with the applicable European and Greek legislation. All proceedings or legal action arising from Certification Policy and Certification Practice Statement of HARICA Public Key Infrastructure must be commenced in the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of Athens Greece.

If a dispute or difference arises in connection with, or out of the interpretation of the Certificate Policy/Certification Practice Statement and the operations of the Certification Authority then the Subscriber concerned may address this dispute to the HARICA Policy Management Committee and shall attempt to resolve or settle such dispute in an amicable way before commencement of any legal proceedings. HARICA Policy Management Committee is responsible to investigate all matters concerning complaints and disputes about the provisioning of the trust services. See also CP/CPS section 3.1.6.

Unless settled amicably, any disputes in connection with or arising out of this Certification Policy and Certification Practice Statement of HARICA Public Key Infrastructure shall be referred and submitted to the Greek courts that are competent and the exclusive venue is Athens Greece

13 TSP and repository licenses, trust marks and audit

HARICA PKI meets the specifications of:

- ETSI EN 319 411-1 “*Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trusted Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General Requirements*”,
- ETSI EN 319 411-2 “*Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trusted Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates*”,
- ETSI EN 319 421 “*Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trusted Service Providers issuing Time-Stamps*”, and
- Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 (e-IDAS) of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market.

HARICA has also included guidelines and procedures from the following documents:

- “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”,
- “Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates”, and
- “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates Code Signing Certificates”,

published at <https://www.cabforum.org>.

In addition to the above standards, HARICA complies with ETSI TS 119 495 that supports Qualified Certificate Profiles and TSP Policy Requirements under the payment services Directive (EU) 2015/2366 and the Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 with

regard to Regulatory Technical Standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication.

HARICA is annually audited by an external Qualified Auditor (i.e. an Accredited Conformity Assessment Body). Audit reports are submitted to Application Software Suppliers and National Supervisory Bodies. A summary of these reports is also available at <https://www.harica.gr/About/Compliance>.